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Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social
choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any
preference proﬁle there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome.
In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice corre-
spondences resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are
anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking. We also show that these
axioms are logically independent.
& 2016 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Background
We consider the classical social choice model with ﬁnitely many voters who have preferences – linear orderings – over a ﬁnite
set of alternatives. A social choice function assigns an alternative to every proﬁle of preferences, and induces an ordinal game in
which every voter has the set of all preferences as strategy space, and evaluates an alternative according to his true, sincere
preference. A social choice function is strategy-proof if reporting his sincere preference is a weakly dominant strategy for every
player in this game. The theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) says that every strategy-proof social choice function
with range at least three must be dictatorial on this range. In other words, any reasonable social choice function is manipulable.
Is this a serious problem? One may argue that strategic voting is an inherent property of democratic processes. For
instance, it is a well-known phenomenon that in parliamentary elections people may not vote for their favorite party since
such a vote may be lost if that party does not exceed the threshold, or is unlikely to become part of the government. Or one
may argue that even though a social choice function is manipulable, it may still be difﬁcult to manipulate successfully, due to
limited information about the voting behavior of others or simply because of computational complexity (see for instance,
Bartholdi et al. (1989), as an early reference). Nevertheless, attempts to manipulate or vote strategically are bound to result
in an outcome that is not the sincere one – the outcome if voters vote truthfully – according to the social choice function
under consideration. Assuming that this social choice function or voting system is chosen because of its appealingy Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
ity, and of The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is
eg), h.peters@maastrichtuniversity.nl (H. Peters).
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Therefore, it is desirable to attain the sincere outcome even if voters vote insincerely or strategically.
How can this be achieved? An equivalent way of formulating strategy-proofness is that the proﬁle of sincere preferences
is always a Nash equilibrium in the associated voting game. Since, according to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem,
strategy-proofness basically implies dictatorship, in effect strategy-proofness is equivalent to the proﬁle of sincere pre-
ferences always being an even strong Nash equilibrium – no group of voters can proﬁtably deviate. Peleg (1978) therefore
considered the following weaker condition: for every proﬁle of sincere preferences there exists a strong Nash equilibrium
resulting in the sincere alternative, i.e., the alternative assigned if the voters would report sincerely. Social choice functions
having this property are called exactly and strongly consistent (ESC).1 Thus, if an ESC social choice function is used, then it is
at least plausible that the sincere alternative results.
One might object that the ESC property is too weak in the sense that there may be other strong Nash equilibria of the
voting game not resulting in the sincere outcome. Unfortunately, however, requiring all strong Nash equilibria to result in
the sincere outcome would again imply dictatorship of the social choice function – see e.g. (Peleg and Peters (2010), p. 100)
for the argument.2 From this point of view, ESC is the best one can hope for. Moreover, even if a strong Nash equilibrium of
the voting game does not result in the sincere outcome it is nevertheless an attractive outcome: it is not only Pareto optimal
but a fortiori in the core of the voting game, which is just a somewhat different way of saying that no coalition can deviate to
the satisfaction of all its members.
An additional motivation for using an ESC social choice function derives from the fact that then the sincere preference
proﬁle itself is not manipulable in the following sense. Suppose a coalition (group of voters) deviates from the sincere
preference proﬁle in such a way that all its members are better off by this deviation. Then there is a deviation by the
complement of that coalition such that at least one member of the originally deviating coalition is not better off compared to
the sincere outcome. In other words, by deviating from the sincere proﬁle no coalition can guarantee (i.e., independently of
the outside agents) to make all its members better off. See Peleg and Procaccia (2007), Peleg and Peters (2010), Sect. 8.5, and
in a related context Peleg and Peters (2015). In still other words, ESC social choice functions not only admit a strong Nash
equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome but also make sincere voting itself a focal strategy for voters and coalitions
in situations where it is difﬁcult to predict how others will vote.
1.2. Feasible elimination procedures
ESC social choice functions can be obtained by selecting alternatives resulting from so-called feasible elimination pro-
cedures, introduced in Peleg (1978). A fortiori, using feasible elimination procedures is the only way to construct ESC social
choice functions under three conditions, namely: the number of voters is greater than or equal to the number of alternatives
minus one, the social choice function is anonymous, and it satisﬁes no veto power. The last condition says that no single
agent can exclude any alternative from being chosen. See Peleg and Peters (2010), Sect. 10.5, which in turn is based on
Holzman (1986). These conditions are natural and thus, feasible elimination procedures are essential for achieving this
particular way of alleviating the consequences of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem.
Feasible elimination procedures work as follows. Assign weights (natural numbers) to the alternatives such that the sum
of these weights is equal to the number of voters plus one. Consider a preference proﬁle and delete an alternative x that is
bottom ranked by at least as many voters as the weight of x; also delete as many preferences from the proﬁle, having x
bottom ranked, as the weight of x. Repeat this procedure for the reduced proﬁle, until one alternative is left. This alternative
is called ‘maximal’ for the preference proﬁle under consideration. It does not have to be unique.
Could feasible elimination procedures be used in practice? To do so, voters should report complete preferences, but it is
well recognized that eliciting more preference information than just (for instance) the top ranked alternatives is beneﬁcial
for the democratic process. In fact, systems applied in practice like plurality with runoff and in particular single transferable
vote (STV) do use more preference information. Recently, Balinski and Laraki (2010) have proposed a voting system based on
majority judgment, which asks extensive preference valuations from voters. Moreover, feasible elimination procedures, by
deﬁnition, have the advantage of providing minorities of voters with the possibility of vetoing undesirable or unacceptable
candidates. See Danilov and Sotskov (2002) for more discussion on this issue.
A potential drawback of feasible elimination procedures is that they may fail to be neutral: it is not always possible to choose all
weights equal. However, if the number of voters is relatively large compared to the number of alternatives then this is only a slight
problem, since weights can always be chosen such as to differ by at most one. Also, selecting from the set of maximal alternatives (the
alternatives obtained from feasible elimination procedures) can be done in a neutral way.We refer the reader to Remark 2.3 for details.
Feasible elimination is a form of vetoing. Related veto procedures have been studied extensively in the literature, e.g. Dutta
(1983), Moulin (1982), or Abdou (1989). Most of these veto procedures are based on a given ordering of the voters and they are
therefore not anonymous, although they may be neutral. In general, social choice functions that are both neutral and anonymous
only exist under certain relations between the number of voters and the number of alternatives (Moulin, 1980).1 In Moulin (1982) such a social choice function is called ‘partially implementable’.
2 Brieﬂy, such a social choice function implements itself in strong Nash equilibrium and therefore must be Maskin monotonic (Maskin, 1999). In turn,
this implies dictatorship by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977).
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We have argued that ESC is a desirable property of a social choice function and that under a few natural conditions ESC social
choice functions can only be obtained by selecting from maximal alternatives, i.e., alternatives resulting from feasible elimination
procedures. Naturally, the correspondence of maximal alternatives associated with a given assignment of weights should have
other reasonable properties besides leading to ESC social choice functions. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to provide an
axiomatic characterization of these social choice correspondences. The axioms that we use are two general conditions: anonymity
andMaskin monotonicity; and a condition related to the blocking power of coalitions. Anonymity is clear, andMaskin monotonicity
(Maskin, 1999) says that if the position of a chosen alternative improves in the preference proﬁle, then it will still be chosen in the
new proﬁle. Maskin monotonicity is well-known as a necessary condition for implementation.
For a given social choice function or correspondence, a coalition can block a set of alternatives if by putting this set at the
bottom part of their preferences no assigned alternative will be in this set, whatever the reported preferences of the outside
voters. A coalition minimally blocks such a set if no proper subcoalition can block it. The announced condition related to the
blocking power of coalitions is called ‘independent blocking’. Its main implication is that if two disjoint sets of alternatives
are minimally blocked by two disjoint coalitions, then the union of the two sets of alternatives is minimally blocked by the
union of those coalitions, that is, no proper subcoalition of that union can block the union of the two sets of alternatives. The
main result of the paper is that the axioms of anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking characterize the
social choice correspondences assigning the maximal alternatives, i.e., the alternatives resulting from feasible elimination
procedures. We argue, furthermore, that this axiomatic characterization can be seen as one possible extension of the
characterization of majority rule for the case of two alternatives by May (1952).
Section 2 presents preliminaries, and in Section 3 we state and prove the characterization result. Section 4 concludes.
Notations The following basic notations are used throughout. For a set D, jDj denotes the cardinality of D, P(D) the power
set, i.e., the set of all subsets of D, and P0ðDÞ the set of all nonempty subsets of D.2. Preliminaries
Let A be the set of m alternatives, mZ2, and let N¼ f1;…;ng, nZ2, be the set of voters. Subsets of N are called coalitions.
Let L be the set of all preferences, i.e., complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relations, on A. Then LN is the set of all
(preference) proﬁles. A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a function H: LN-P0ðAÞ.
The main SCCs of interest in this paper are based on so-called feasible elimination procedures. Informally, ﬁrst, assign
weights βðxÞAN to the alternatives xAA. Consider a preference proﬁle and take an alternative x that is bottom ranked at
least βðxÞ times. Delete that alternative from the proﬁle and at the same time delete βðxÞ preferences where x is bottom
ranked. Repeat this procedure until one alternative remains, which happens under appropriate conditions.
Formally, we have the following deﬁnition. (For a few examples see below.)
Deﬁnition 2.1. Assume that nþ1Zm and let β:A-N satisfyPxAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1. Let RNALN . A feasible elimination procedure (f.
e.p.) for RN is a sequence ðx1;C1;…; xm1;Cm1; xmÞ such that
(a) A¼ fx1;…; xmg,
(b) C1;…;Cm1 are pairwise disjoint subsets of N and jCjj ¼ βðxjÞ for all j¼ 1;…;m1,
(c) xkR
ixj for all j¼ 1;…;m1, k¼ jþ1;…;m, and iACj.
Thus, in a feasible elimination procedure ðx1;C1;…; xm1;Cm1; xmÞ, by condition (c) alternative x1 is bottom ranked for
all voters in C1 and by condition (b), jC1j ¼ βðx1Þ. Now x1 is deleted from RN and also the preferences of the voters in C1 are
deleted. In the remaining proﬁle, x2 is bottom ranked for all voters in C2 by condition (c), and by condition (b), jC2j ¼ βðx2Þ, so
that x2 can be deleted and also the preferences of the voters in C2. And so on and so forth. Observe that after deleting x1
there are nβðx1Þ voters left, after deleting x2 there are nβðx1Þβðx2Þ voters left, and after deleting xm1 there are
nβðx1Þ…βðxm1Þ ¼ βðxmÞ1Z0 voters left.
An important observation about f.e.p.'s is the following. Suppose an alternative x is bottom ranked by (at least) the voters in
some coalition Swith jSj ¼ βðxÞ, in a proﬁle RNALN . Then xmust be eliminated in every f.e.p. for RN. To see this suppose there is an
f.e.p. in which x is not eliminated and let y be the alternative eliminated last, say via coalition T. Then the ﬁnally left voters form a
coalition S0 containing S. We have βðyÞþβðxÞ ¼ jTjþjS0jþ1 by the foregoing, but also jT jþjS0jZβðyÞþβðxÞ, a contradiction.
It is not difﬁcult to see that there exists always at least one f.e.p. under the assumptions in the deﬁnition. If every
alternative xj is bottom ranked less than βðxjÞ times, then the total number of voters is at most
Pm
j ¼ 1 βðxjÞm, which is equal
to nþ1m and therefore strictly smaller than n. A similar argument can be made after elimination of each alternative
x1;…; xm2.
Henceforth in this paper we assume nþ1Zm. An alternative x is RN – maximal if there exists an f.e.p.
ðx1;C1;…; xm1;Cm1; xÞ. We denote
MβðRNÞ ¼ fxAA: xisRNmaximalg:
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P
xAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1.
The importance of the SCC Mβ derives from the fact that every selection from it produces an ESC social choice function,
and that under some additional but natural conditions, selecting from Mβ for some weight function β is the only way to
achieve ESC social choice functions. We refer to Section 1 of the paper for more explanation.
Example 2.2. Let A¼ fa; b; cg.
(a) Let N¼ f1;…;5g, βðaÞ ¼ βðbÞ ¼ βðcÞ ¼ 2, and consider the preference proﬁle
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
b c a c a
c b b a c
a a c b b
then there are two feasible elimination procedures, namely ða; f1;2g; b; f4;5g; cÞ and ðb; f4;5g; a; f1;2g; cÞ. Hence
MβðRNÞ ¼ fcg.
(b) Let N¼ f1;…;11g, βðaÞ ¼ βðbÞ ¼ βðcÞ ¼ 4, and consider the preference proﬁle
R1;R2;R3 R4;R5 R6;R7;R8 R9;R10;R11
b c a a
c b b c
a a c b
In this case there are several feasible elimination procedures, due to the fact that there are several choices in selecting
eliminating coalitions, but a is always eliminated ﬁrst. Two examples are: ða; f1;2;3;4g; b; f5;9;10;11g; cÞ and
ða; f1;2;4;5g; c; f3;6;7;8g; bÞ. In this case MβðRNÞ ¼ fb; cg. Note that in this proﬁle a is the Condorcet and also the plurality
winner, but it is also the alternative ranked last by a plurality of voters. In this example, the alternatives b and c may
indeed be better ‘compromises’ than alternative a.
Note that it is not always possible to choose all weights equal as in the examples above, so it is not always possible to
achieve neutrality.
Remark 2.3. In fact, there are two issues concerning neutrality. First, weights cannot always be chosen to be equal, but they
can be chosen so as to differ by at most one.3 If the number of voters is relatively large then neutrality is almost achieved. For
instance, if there are ten alternatives and thousand voters then nine weights can be chosen equal to 100 and the remaining
weight equal to 101. Second, although Mβ may not be neutral, one can choose neutrally from MβðRNÞ.3. Axiomatic characterization of Mβ
Let H be an SCC. We ﬁrst introduce some terminology and notations concerning the blocking power of coalitions.
A coalition SAP0ðNÞ blocks a set BAP0ðAÞ at H if for any proﬁle QSALS for S such that x Qi y for each xAA⧹B and yAB, we
have HðQS;RN⧹SÞDA⧹B for all RN⧹SALN⧹S. In words, a coalition blocks a set of alternatives if by putting this set at the bottom
part of the preference of each coalition member, no alternative in this set will be chosen.
Coalition SAP0ðNÞ minimally blocks B at H if no proper nonempty subcoalition of S blocks B at H. If a set BAP0ðAÞ is
blocked by some nonempty coalition at H, then we deﬁne the blocking coefﬁcient bH(B) as the minimal size of such a
nonempty coalition, hence
bHðBÞ ¼minfjSj: SAP0ðNÞ blocks B at Hg:
Otherwise, we deﬁne bHðBÞ ¼ nþ1. Note that, since HðRNÞa∅ for all RNALN by deﬁnition, no coalition blocks A, and thus
bHðAÞ ¼ nþ1 always. The choice of blocking coefﬁcient nþ1 for an unblocked set of alternatives will have some con-
sequences under the last axiom below, see also Remark 3.1. We call bH: P0ðAÞ-f1;…;nþ1g the blocking function of H.
We consider the following axioms on H.
Anonymity For all RNALN and for all permutations π of N, HðR1;…;RnÞ ¼HðRπð1Þ;…;RπðnÞÞ.
Maskin monotonicity For all RN ¼ ðR1;…;RnÞ, QN ¼ ðQ1;…;QnÞ ALN , and xAHðQNÞ, if xQiy implies xRiy for all yAA and
iAN, then xAHðRNÞ.
Independent blocking The blocking function bH is additive, i.e., bHðB1 [ B2Þ ¼ bHðB1ÞþbHðB2Þ for all B1;B2AP0ðAÞ with
B1 \ B2 ¼∅.
Anonymity needs no further explanation. Maskin monotonicity says that if a chosen alternative does not gets worse in
any one's preference, then it remains to be chosen. It is a necessary condition for implementation in Nash equilibrium
(Maskin, 1999). For later reference we also formulate the following weaker version of monotonicity. In this weaker version3 In the next section we formulate this choice as an additional axiom.
B. Peleg, H. Peters / Research in Economics 71 (2017) 43–50 47we require that if an alternative x is shifted upwards in some preference, then the preference among all the other alter-
natives does not change. Note that in the premiss of Maskin monotonicity preferences among the other alternatives may
change, as long as x is shifted upwards.
Monotonicity For all RN ¼ ðR1;…;RnÞ, QN ¼ ðQ1;…;QnÞ ALN , and xAHðQNÞ, if xQiy ) xRiy and zRiy3zQiy for all
y; zAA⧹fxg and iAN, then xAHðRNÞ and HðRNÞDHðQNÞ.
That monotonicity is weaker than Maskin monotonicity can be seen as follows. It is sufﬁcient to consider QN and RN in the
statement of monotonicity such that RN arises from QN by switching alternative xwith the alternative right above x, say y, for
just one voter. By Maskin monotonicity, xAHðRNÞ. Suppose there is an alternative zAA⧹fxg with zAHðRNÞ. By Maskin
monotonicity again, now applied to z, we obtain zAHðQNÞ. Thus, HðRNÞDHðQNÞ.
Under anonymity, independent blocking implies for instance that if S1 minimally blocks B1 and S2 minimally blocks B2,
and S1 and S2 as well as B1 and B2 are disjoint, then S1 [ S2 minimally blocks B1 [ B2. Observe, here, that by deﬁnition
S1 [ S2 blocks B1 [ B2; the contribution of the independent blocking condition is the addition of the word ‘minimal’, so no
smaller coalition can block B1 [ B2.
Remark 3.1. By the choice bHðAÞ ¼ nþ1, independent blocking implies the equivalence bHðBÞ ¼ nþ13B¼ A. Namely,
suppose bHðBÞ ¼ nþ1 for some ∅aB⊊A. Then bHðAÞ ¼ bHðBÞþbHðA⧹BÞ implies that bHðA⧹BÞ ¼ 0, a contradiction since
bHðA⧹BÞZ1 by deﬁnition. It also implies that H is non-imposed, i.e., for every aAA there is a proﬁle RNALN such that
HðRNÞ ¼ fag. To see this, suppose that there is some aAA such that HðRNÞafag for all RNALN . Then bHðA⧹fagÞ ¼ nþ1, so
independent blocking implies bHðfagÞ ¼ bHðAÞbHðA⧹fagÞ ¼ 0, a contradiction.
The following theorem is the announced characterization of the social choice correspondences Mβ .
Theorem 3.2. Let nþ1Zm and let H be an SCC. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) H satisﬁes anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
(2) There is a function β:A-N with
P
xAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1 such that H¼Mβ .
In the proof of Theorem 3.2 we use the following lemmas, starting with a proof of Maskin monotonicity of Mβ .4
Lemma 3.3. Let β:A-N such that
P
xAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1. Then Mβ is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Let QN and RN be as in the deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity, and xAMβðQNÞ. Without loss of generality we assume that
there is a voter v such that QN⧹fvg ¼ RN⧹fvg. Let f  ¼ ðx1;C1;…; xm1;Cm1; xÞ be an f.e.p. for QN, where A¼ fx1;…; xm1; xg. If
v=2C1 [ … [ Cm1 then it is easy to see that f * is still an f.e.p. for RN, so that xAMβðRNÞ. Now assume vAC1 [ … [ Cm1. If vACj
with j41, then we may eliminate x1;…; xj1 and all voters in C1 [ … [ Cj1 ﬁrst, and next continue the argument with the
remaining proﬁle, where now all voters in Cj have xj bottom ranked according to QCj. So, without loss of generality, let vAC1.
The rest of the proof is based on a three step algorithm.
Step 1If the bottom alternative of Rv is equal to x1, then f * is still an f.e.p. for RN and we are done. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2Let the bottom alternative of Rv be xℓax1, so ℓAf2;…;m1g. If all voters in Cℓ have xℓ as bottom alternative in RN,
then we can ﬁrst eliminate xℓ via Cℓ and go back to Step 1 for the reduced proﬁle. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3Take v^ACℓ with xℓ not as bottom alternative and note that the bottom alternative of Rv^ ¼Qv^ is some xj with joℓ
(since xj must be eliminated before xℓ in f *). Then modify Cℓ to C^ℓ ¼ ðCℓ [ fvgÞ⧹fv^g and modify C1 to C^1 ¼ ðC1 [ fv^gÞ⧹fvg. (In
words, we switch v and v^.) Go back to Step 1.
Repeat this procedure until the ﬁnal substitute of v in the modiﬁed C1 has x1 at bottom. Then we can apply an f.e.p.
resulting in x, so that xAMβðRNÞ. □
In what follows we use the notation βðBÞ for PxABβðxÞ, where BAP0ðAÞ.
Lemma 3.4. Let β:A-N such that
P
xAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1. Let BAP0ðAÞ and SAP0ðNÞ. Then S minimally blocks B at Mβ if and only if
jSj ¼ βðBÞ.
Proof. For the only-if statement, suppose that Sminimally blocks B atMβ . Let QSALS such that x Qi y for all iAS, xAA⧹B and
yAB. Then MβðQS;RN⧹SÞDA⧹B for all RN⧹SALN⧹S. Consider, in particular, a proﬁle ~RN⧹S such that x ~Riy for all xAB, yAA⧹B, and
iAN⧹S. For an f.e.p. ðx1;C1;…; xm1;Cm1; xmÞ for ðQS; ~R
N⧹SÞ we have xmAMβðQS; ~RN⧹SÞDA⧹B and therefore BDfx1;…; xm1g.
By deﬁnition of ~R
N⧹S
we must have CjDS for every jAf1;…;m1g with xjAB. Therefore, jSjZ
P
jA f1;…;m1g:xjABjCjj ¼ βðBÞ.
Now consider any coalition TDS such that jT j ¼ βðBÞ and a proﬁle PTALT such that xPiy for all xAA⧹B and yAB. Then
jN⧹T j ¼ nβðBÞ ¼ βðA⧹BÞ1oβðA⧹BÞ, so that any f.e.p. for any ðPT ;RN⧹T Þ results in an alternative of A⧹B. Hence, T blocks B at
Mβ , so that T¼S by minimality of S. Hence, jSj ¼ βðBÞ.4 The current proof is a special case of the proof in Peleg and Peters (2015), Lemma 3.7, and is included here for completeness.
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jT jZβðBÞ by the same argument as in the ﬁrst part of the proof. Hence, S minimally blocks B at Mβ . □
The next lemma is crucial for proving the implication ðiÞ ) ðiiÞ in Theorem 3.2.5
Lemma 3.5. Let β:A-N such that
P
xAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1. Let xAAand RNALN . The following statements are equivalent.
(i) xAMβðRNÞ.
(ii) There are no SAP0ðNÞ and BAP0ðAÞ such that jSjZβðA⧹BÞ, xAA⧹B, and y Ri x for all iAS and yAB.
Proof. For the implication ðiÞ ) ðiiÞ, let xAMβðRNÞ and let ðx1;C1;…; xm1;Cm1; xÞ be an f.e.p. for RN. Suppose there were S
and B as in ðiiÞ. Write B¼ fxi1 ;…; xijBj gDfx1;…; xm1g, then [jBjj ¼ 1Cij
 
\ S¼∅ by deﬁnition of an f.e.p., and j [jBjj ¼ 1 Cij j ¼ βðBÞ.
Hence jSjþj [jBjj ¼ 1 Cij jZβðA⧹BÞþβðBÞ ¼ nþ1, a contradiction.
We prove the implication ðiiÞ ) ðiÞ by induction on the number of alternatives m. Assume that ðiiÞ holds.
If m¼2, say A¼ fx; yg, then there is no SAP0ðNÞ such that jSjZβðxÞ and yRix for all iAS, so that MβðRNÞ ¼ fxg.
Now suppose that m42 and that the implication ðiiÞ ) ðiÞ holds if there are less than m alternatives. For every
BAP0ðA⧹fxgÞ denote SB ¼ fiAN: yRix for all yABg. Then ðiiÞ is equivalent to
jSBjoβðA⧹BÞfor allBAP0ðA⧹fxgÞ ð1Þ
hence to
jN⧹SBjZβðBÞfor allBAP0ðA⧹fxgÞ: ð2Þ
We consider two cases.
Case 1There exists ~BAP0ðA⧹fxgÞ with j ~Bjrm2 and jN⧹S ~B j ¼ βð ~BÞ.
For this case we consider the two following subproblems:
 N1 ¼N⧹S ~B , A1 ¼ ~B [ fxg, β1ðyÞ ¼ βðyÞ for all yA ~B, β1ðxÞ ¼ 1, and Ri1 ¼ RijA1 for all iAN1.6 N2 ¼ S ~B , A2 ¼ A⧹ ~B, β2ðyÞ ¼ βðyÞ for all yAA2, and Ri2 ¼ RijA2 for all iAN2.
We next show that (1) holds for the ﬁrst subproblem. If not, then there is a BAP0ð ~BÞ such that jT jZβ1ðA1⧹BÞ, where
T ¼ fiAN1: yRi1xfor allyABg. Then jT [ S ~B j ¼ jTjþjS ~B jZ ½β1ðxÞþβð ~BÞβðBÞþ½nβð ~BÞ ¼ βðA⧹BÞ, hence jSBjZβðA⧹BÞ, which is a
violation of (1) for the original problem. Therefore, (1) must hold for the ﬁrst subproblem, implying that xAMβ1 ðRN11 Þ by
induction.
Similarly, suppose that (1) does not hold for the second subproblem. Then there is a BAP0ðA⧹ð ~B [ fxgÞÞ such that
jT jZβ2ðA2⧹BÞ, where T ¼ fiAS ~B : yRi2xfor allyABg. Then jT [ ðN⧹S ~B Þj ¼ jT jþjN⧹S ~B jZ ½βðAÞβðBÞβð ~BÞþβð ~BÞ ¼ βðA⧹BÞ, which
is a violation of (1) for the original problem. We conclude that (1) must hold for the second subproblem as well, so that
xAMβ2 ðRN22 Þ by induction.
Now let ðz1;C1;…; zj ~Bj;Cj ~Bj; xÞ be an f.e.p. for the ﬁrst subproblem and let ðu1;D1;…;um1j ~B j;Dm1j ~Bj; xÞ be an f.e.p. for
the second subproblem. Since, in particular, yRix for all yA ~B and iAN2 ¼ S ~B , it follows that
ðu1;D1;…;um1j ~Bj;Dm1j ~B j; z1;C1;…; zj ~B j;Cj ~Bj; xÞ
is an f.e.p. for the original problem, implying that in this case we have xAMβðRNÞ.
Case 2 For all ~BAP0ðA⧹fxgÞ with j ~Bjrm2 we have jN⧹S ~B j4βð ~BÞ.
Suppose there is an ℓAN such that x is not ranked at the last or second last position in Rℓ, and let by be the alternative
ranked right below x. We switch x and by in voter ℓ's preference to obtain a new preference bRℓ and a new preference proﬁle
bRN ¼ ðR1;…;Rℓ1; bRℓ;Rℓþ1;…;RNÞ that still satisﬁes (2): for any set B with jBjrm2 this holds because of the strict
inequality in Case 2, and for B¼ A⧹fxg this holds since x is not ranked last in bRℓ.
If Case 1 applies to bRN , then xAMβðbRNÞ. Thus, by Lemma 3.3, xAMβðRNÞ.7 If Case 1 does not apply to bRN , then we repeat this
step for some voter ℓ0AN with x not ranked last or second last at bRℓ0 , and so on, until either Case 1 applies or there is no
voter left with x not ranked at the last or second last position.
In the latter case, we have a proﬁle, say ~R
N
, for which still (2) holds and with x ranked last or second last for each voter
iAN. Observe that y is last ranked for all voters in N⧹Sfyg for all yAA⧹fxg. Also, by (2), jN⧹SfygjZβðyÞ for all yAA⧹fxg. It follows5 The lemma is a reformulation of an existing result: see Theorem 9.3.6 in Peleg and Peters (2010), which in turn goes back to a result of Polishchuk
(1978).
6 RijB denotes the restriction of R
i to B.
7 In fact, monotonicity would be sufﬁcient for this argument.
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N
every yAA⧹fxg is bottom ranked by at least βðyÞ voters and therefore eliminated, so thatMβð ~R
NÞ ¼ fxg.
By Lemma 3.3 again, xAMðRNÞ.
By (2), Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, which completes the proof of the lemma. □
We are now sufﬁciently equipped to prove the main result of the paper.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We ﬁrst prove the implication ðiiÞ ) ðiÞ.
Let β:A-N such that
P
xAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1. Clearly, Mβ is anonymous. Maskin monotonicity of Mβ follows from Lemma 3.3.
From Lemma 3.4 it follows that the blocking function b¼ bMβ of Mβ is β, i.e., bðBÞ ¼ βðBÞ for all BAP0ðAÞ, and independent
blocking follows since β is additive.
For the implication ðiÞ ) ðiiÞ, let H satisfy the three axioms. Deﬁne β:A-N by βðxÞ ¼ bHðxÞ for all xAA. Then by inde-
pendent blocking,
P
xAAβðxÞ ¼ nþ1, so Mβ is well-deﬁned. We prove that H¼Mβ . Let RNALN .
First, let xAMβðRNÞ. Then there exists an f.e.p. ðx1;C1;…; xm1;Cm1; xÞwith respect to RN. Let now QN be the proﬁle that is
obtained from RN by lowering xj to the bottom of Ri for all iACj and for j¼ 1;…;m1, and leaving everything else intact. By
the deﬁnition of blocking coefﬁcients, HðQNÞDA⧹fxjg for all j¼ 1;…;m1, so that HðQNÞ ¼ fxg. Finally, since xRixj for all iACj
and j¼ 1;…;m1 (by the third condition in Deﬁnition 2.1), and since H is Maskin monotonic, xAHðRNÞ.
Second, let xAHðRNÞ. Suppose there are SAP0ðNÞ and BAP0ðAÞ as in (ii) of Lemma 3.5, i.e., jSjZβðA⧹BÞ, xAA⧹B, and y Ri x
for all yAB. For each iAS let QiAL be a preference with yQiz3yRiz for all y; zAA⧹B and with yQiz for all yAB and zAA⧹B.
Since jSjZβðA⧹BÞ ¼ bHðA⧹BÞ, by anonymity we have that S blocks A⧹B at H, so that x=2HðQS;RN⧹SÞ. On the other hand, since
xAHðRNÞ and yRix for all iAS and yAB, Maskin monotonicity of H implies xAHðQS;RN⧹SÞ, a contradiction. Hence, xAMβðRNÞ
by Lemma 3.5. □
We next show that the three axioms in Theorem 3.2 are logically independent, by exhibiting three examples.
Example 3.6. Let A¼ fx; yg and let N¼ f1;2;3;4g. Deﬁne the SCC H as follows. Let RNALN . If R1 ¼ R2 ¼ yx (i.e., both 1 and
2 prefer y above x) then HðRNÞ ¼ fyg. If R2 ¼ R3 ¼ R4 ¼ xy then HðRNÞ ¼ fxg. In all other cases, HðRNÞ ¼ fx; yg. Then H is Maskin
monotonic and independently blocking: bHðxÞþbHðyÞ ¼ 3þ2¼ 5¼ bHðAÞ. However, H is not anonymous.
Example 3.7. It is not difﬁcult to see that there exist anonymous selections from Mβ: e.g., take VAL and let FðRNÞ be the
alternative of MβðRNÞ that is maximal according to V. Such a selection is still independently blocking. However, it cannot be
Maskin monotonic (if mZ3) because then by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) it would be dictatorial. It is not hard to see
that F is still monotonic, as follows. Suppose that RN and QN are as in the deﬁnition of monotonicity, that is, RN arises from QN
by shifting x upwards, leaving everything else intact. Suppose that fxg ¼ FðQNÞ, hence x is the V-maximal element of MβðQNÞ.
Then by monotonicity of Mβ we have xAMβðRNÞDMβðQNÞ. This implies that x is still the V-maximal element of MβðRNÞ,
hence FðRNÞ ¼ fxg. We conclude that Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 3.2 cannot be weakened to monotonicity.
Example 3.8. The Pareto correspondence P assigns to each proﬁle RN the set fxAA: there is no yAAwith yPix for all iANg. It
is anonymous and Maskin monotonic, but it is not independently blocking: bPðBÞ ¼ n for every BAP0ðAÞ, BaA.
We conclude this section by discussing the relation with the majority rule for the case m¼2, say A¼ fa; bg. In the for-
mulation of May (1952), the majority rule is a social welfare function which ranks xAfa; bg above yAfa; bg if and only if a
strict majority of voters ranks x above y. In case of a tie, the rule assigns indifference between a and b. May (1952) char-
acterizes this rule by four conditions: single-valuedness, anonymity, neutrality, and Maskin monotonicity (which takes a
simple form in this case).
In our framework, if m¼2 and the number of voters is odd, then majority rule is equivalent to the (single-valued)
correspondence Mβ with βðaÞ ¼ βðbÞ. If the number of voters is even, then closest to majority rule is Mβ (again single-valued)
with either βðaÞ ¼ βðbÞþ1 or βðaÞ ¼ βðbÞ1 – we need to break ties. For m¼2, our axioms of anonymity, Maskin mono-
tonicity, and independent blocking are still independent: see Examples 3.6, 3.8, and for the independence of Maskin
monotonicity take minority rule with tie-breaking. These three axioms characterize a larger set of rules, namely for all
allowed choices of weights. Consider the following condition, formulated here for general m and a correspondence H with
blocking function bH:
Weak neutrality For all B;B0AP0ðAÞ with jBj ¼ jB0j, jbHðBÞbHðB0Þjr jBj.
For the case m¼2, adding this condition to anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking, returns exactly
the majority rule if the number of voters is odd, and the two rules above if the number of voters is even. By using the same
three examples, it follows that the other three conditions are still logically independent if weak neutrality is added. If m42
then the additional condition of weak neutrality selects the correspondences Mβ which are as neutral as possible. Thus,
particularly in the axiomatic sense, feasible eliminations procedures can be seen as one possible extension of majority rule
to the case of more than two alternatives.
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For any sincere preference proﬁle, in the game associated with an exactly and strongly consistent social choice function
there exists always a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. Also, for such a social choice function,
sincere voting itself is a safe strategy in the sense that a coalition deviating from it is not guaranteed a better outcome. In
order to construct exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions feasible elimination procedures play a central role.
Moreover, voting systems based on feasible elimination procedures are of practical relevance as well. In this paper, we have
provided an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence that assigns maximal alternatives, i.e., alter-
natives resulting from feasible elimination procedures. The proof of our axiomatic characterization is closely related to
earlier results, in particular Theorem 9.3.6 in Peleg and Peters (2010), which, in turn, goes back to an unpublished result of
Polishchuk (1978). This theorem is phrased in terms of an effectivity function and its core.References
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